"managed." I want to argue that what is at stake in extreme makeover shows such as The Swan is precisely the subjection of the participants' bodies and lives to the disciplinary techniques applied by the dominant socio-political institutions. The Swan belongs to the recently popularized genre of "extreme makeover TV", which treats post-Big Brother audiences to documentaries featuring the remodeling of real people's homes, gardens, wardrobes, and -as has been the case with shows such as ABC's Extreme Makeover, MTV's I Want a Famous Face and Fox's The Swanbodies. 2 There is, however, something singular and unique about the way in which
The Swan treats the subject of makeover by framing it in bio-zoological terms, and by introducing the survival of the fittest as its principle of entertainment. The program is designed as a competition between a group of average looking women, who are all undergoing a three-month long "total transformation." This involves cosmetic surgery, weight loss program and "personality training," all undertaken without being able to see themselves in a mirror. Each episode features two competitors who are then judged by a panel of experts on the success of their transformation, with the overall winner of the series being crowned "The Swan."
While I suggest that extreme makeover TV is part of the global biopolitics of life management, the aim of this article is not merely diagnostic. I am first and foremost interested in the possibility of developing a counter-narrative to this rather gloomy story of biopolitical disciplinarity. It is in the area of bioethics that I want to locate this counter-narrative. Bioethics is not conceptualized here as yet another disciplinary practice telling us in advance how our bodies should and should not be treated.
Eschewing the systematic normativity and formal prescriptiveness of many traditional forms of bioethics, my bioethical project arises in response to the beautifully monstrous bodies of The Swan's participants. Proposing to read the show's "swans"
as twenty-first century neo-cyborgs bearing the marks of technology on their bodies, I
want to explore the promising ethical ambivalence of the kinship between humans, animals and machines these bodies exemplify (even if, it may be argued, the program itself ultimately forecloses on this promise).
"Ladies, always remember where you came from and how you got here, and don't forget to live HAPPILY EVER AFTER!"
(The Swan, Fox, 2004)
The biopolitics of makeover culture
First of all, a few more words about biopolitics, a concept that is being increasingly used by cultural theorists to describe the political regime of modern Western democracies. Foucault traces back the origins of this regime to the classical rule of power over life and death, whereby the sovereign exercised "his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing." The sovereign's "power of life and death" amounted to the right to take the life of his subjects and to allow them to live. 3 In modern times, however, this power has undergone a process of transformation, with more focus on the positive management of the life of the whole population rather than just on the defense of the sovereign. What is at stake in modern political regimes, claims Foucault, is "the biological existence of a population." 4 Even though sustaining and multiplying life has become the highest prerogative of modern power, war, genocide and putting to death are seen as a necessary, if undesirable, part of this regime of "life management."
Foucault distinguishes two levels on which this regime of life and death has been operating since the seventeenth century: that of individual bodies and that of whole populations. The first one of these is centered on the body as a machine:
its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this [is] ensured by the procedures of power that characterize[] the disciplines: an anatomo-politics of the human body.
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The second level of power works on the species body, "the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes." It takes care of issues such as propagation, births and mortality, life expectancy and general health. It is the regulation of these latter issues that Foucault describes as "a biopolitics of the population," although we could argue that these two levels are interpenetrated and that biopolitics entails an anatomo-politics, i.e. the disciplining of the body-machine, the control over the mechanics of life. Biopolitical life is therefore seen as a set of mechanical processes which need to be properly controlled -and this control becomes an important task for the modern sovereign. Significantly, the Greek etymology of the word bios, which in common parlance stands for the material "stuff" of life, points to "a form or way of living proper to an individual or a group." 6 Biological life is thus always already a political existence, it occupies "the very center of the political scene of modernity." 7 From this vantage point, the population can be described as both a political and a material entity, consisting of machinic elements which are endowed with "life" and which need to be properly administered.
Taking Foucault's ideas further, in Homo Sacer Agamben positions violence as constitutive to sovereign power while also identifying the concentration camp and the great totalitarian state of the twentieth century as two exemplary places of modern biopolitics. 8 In either of these places, biological life enters the political realm in most explicit ways -however, it does so only as an exception; it "presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion." 9 Agamben therefore challenges Foucault's claim that, on the one hand, modern biopolitics is a new form of politics that constitutes a decisive break from classical political formations and that, on the other, sovereignty is losing its political purchase in the era of biopolitics. He also radicalizes Foucault's concept of biopolitics by arguing that it is not really the inclusion of zoē (life itself, the simple fact of living) in the polis or even the fact that "life itself" becomes a principal object of the calculations of state power that is most significant about modern politics. 10 What is even more important for Agamben is that in modern democracies "the realm of bare life -which is originally situated at the margins of the political order -gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction." 11 In contemporary politics the original exclusion of zoē from the polis (which is actually "an inclusive exclusion," an exceptio) thus becomes extended and generalized to the point where it becomes the rule, i.e. "the fundamental political structure." 12 In an article written for Le Monde in 2004, Agamben quotes "bio-political tattooing," i.e. being finger-printed and iris-scanned and then having one's biometric data entered into a digital database when entering the United States, as one example of this exceptional procedure, which used to be "imposed on criminals and political defendants" 13 but is now being extended onto citizens of all states who physically and politically find themselves on the threshold of the USA. The inherently violent structure of the political, which Agamben identifies in the concentration camp and the totalitarian state, thus seems to have been transferred to both the globalized and localized spaces of governance in the twenty-first century. In the light of the "global war on terror" post-9/11, the establishment of "terrorist" detainment camps such as Guantánamo Bay, which are exempt from international jurisdiction, and the development of stringent immigration policies which involve the setting up of asylum seeker detention centers both within and outside the borders of the European Union, the list of the exemplary places of modern biopolitics proposed by Agamben in his 1995 book Homo Sacer (Engl. translation 1998) needs to be revised or expanded.
Indeed, in State of Exception Agamben himself extends the biopolitical framework to the "military order" instituted by the president of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 -a paradoxical state of events in which law is suspended by the force of law, thus leaving in operation "a force of law without law." Enlightenment self-remaking took place in public, and was dependent on being "seen" by others as transformed."
The "before" and "after" images of cosmetic surgery patients are a legacy of this need for visibility -and so are the photographs and video clips on The Swan which constantly compare the participants' "old selves" with their new transformed looks.
However, Gilman also points out that the satisfaction resulting from being finally perceived as "normal" is underpinned by the opposite sentiment on the part of the viewers of such a transformation. The viewers take delight in being able to reassert the difference between their own "authenticity" and the makeover participants' phoniness: the latter are only passing themselves off as the "real thing." In the context of this analysis, I want to suggest that the success of The Swan as TV entertainment depends precisely on the gap between "normal" viewers and the contestants who want to undergo a transformation. Contrary to a number of TV critics who focus on the identification of both The Swan's audiences and its participants with the American dream -i.e. a belief that we can all be happy, beautiful and successful one day -I claim it is rather the disidentification between the two groups that is being achieved here, something that reasserts the viewers' moral superiority and confirms their distance from someone else's physical and emotional pain. It is precisely this disidentification with those in need of a makeover that serves for me as a hinge between the two layers of contemporary biopolitics The Swan embraces -that working on individual bodies and on whole populations. This psychological hinge serves to drum a conservative message home: namely that it is only others "out there"
-overweight "ugly ducklings," depressed women with facial scars and gapped teeth, but also, by (perhaps too quick an) extension, "diseased immigrants" or "oppressed
Iraqis" -who are in need of a makeover. It is they who need the restoration of the signal points of liberalism: freedom, autonomy and the right to happiness (translated on The Swan into "becoming your absolute best"). By isolating the "freaks" on the TV screen for the pleasure and relief of the nation, by making freedom and happiness only skin-deep, the health and well-being of the American (as well as British, Australian, etc.) population is confirmed.
If we follow Gilman's statement that "A concern with "hygiene" in the broadest sense and aesthetic surgery's role in the physical alteration of the "ugliness" of the body led the aesthetic surgeon to become the guarantor of the hygiene of the state, the body and the psyche," 18 we could perhaps go so far as to say that The Swan is making post-9/11
America feel beautiful again, it is rebuilding her self-esteem and publicly healing her wounds. As Rachel, the winner of the first Swan series, declares in the final beauty pageant, "The reason I would like to be The Swan is that I believe that this program has given me so much. It's given me my self-esteem and a sense of who I am, and now I'd actually like to be able to give that back, and teach everybody else that they matter. That they have a place in this world, and they have to believe in themselves and that they can bring out the best that they can possibly be". The public confessions of the final pageant' s participants on why they deserve to be crowned The Swan could be seen as exemplifying "the aesthetic and moral sensibility of the new citizen, Taking a further cue from Agamben, we could perhaps go so far as to suggest that The Swan's participants are made to perform the role of homines sacri, people whose lives are devoid of a sacred function in a community and who can be killed but not sacrificed. Originally functioning as a limit concept in the Roman social order, for Agamben homo sacer is positioned "outside both human and divine law;" 22 s/he can undergo abuse which is unpunishable because it functions in the zone of exception.
Homo sacer thus serves as a constitutive outside to the socio-politicial order, ensuring its survival and wellbeing by being banned from it. 23 Significantly, for Agamben it is this ban that constitutes the original political relation. In The Swan the ban takes the form of a self-imposed exclusion, which is made evident in pre-op interviews. During these interviews the candidates explain why they do not belong in the human order and express the desire for joining it. This diagnosis is confirmed by the panel of experts and handed over to the viewers, who are allowed to "see" the unquestioned need for all these normalization procedures the candidates undergo. The bodies and lives of those "ugly ducklings" literally demarcate the borders of the healthy community, they make America whole. Any ambivalence about the candidate's "abnormal" bodies and lives that they could possibly share with the viewers on the other side of the screen is quickly erased via the triumphalist rhetoric and aesthetic of revelation employed in each episode's finale. When the contestants are placed before the veiled mirror, the success of their transformation depends on the misrecognition they experience when the veil drops and they are faced with their new look. This is the moment when the viewers can rejoice at their own cognitive knowledge, for which they have been prepared throughout the program -having killed the homo sacer, they are now ready to welcome its resurrected alter ego into the healthy community of the living. Like the medieval werewolf, remaining "in the collective unconscious as a hybrid of human and animal," 24 divided between the state of nature and polis, the ugly duckling can be "charmed out" of its abnormality. As a swan, a "good animal," it can rejoin the dominant political order from which it was previously banned.
To sum up, we can see here that the participants' bodies are being treated as pieces of machinery; they are objects to be owned, manipulated and symbolically annihilated.
However, this anatomo-politics of the human body coexists with the biopolitical management of the population as a whole, including the show's viewers, producers and participants. What Foucault describes as technologies of the self -"which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and a way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" 25 -have become here another form of disciplinary technologies, whereby an act of self-fashioning partakes of the wider regime of biopower that disciplines individual bodies and regulates populations. The contestants' real and symbolic passage from the banned underworld of ugly ducklings to a eugenically driven world of swan beauty in which "only some will make it" is confirmed (or not) by a successful "passing" as a legitimate member of this new community, beautiful enough and transformed enough. The concept of passing, pejoratively understood in the nineteenth-century as an attempt to disguise one's real racial self, works well, according to Gilman, in analyzing cosmetic surgery precisely because it foregrounds the racial, eugenic connotations of makeover practices. We can thus conclude that the competition between the two contestants in each episode, culminating in a pageant contest between the winners of all the preceding episodes, reminds us that only the fittest pass successfully, and that a total transformation is an impossible dream.
Desire for the face "before the world was made": from biopolitics to bioethics However, it is not only passing on the biological level that is supposed to be achieved in such makeover practices. Gilman links physical transformation with a transcendent desire for mastery and closure:
It is the desire for control, for the face that existed "before the world was made," before we came to recognize that we were thrown into the world, never its master, that lies at the heart of "passing." Mortality is the ultimate proof of this lack of control over the world, but real history, real politics can have much the same effect. Becoming aware that one is marked through one's imagined visibility as ageing, or inferior, or nonerotic, concepts that become interchangeable, can make one long for the solace of that original fantasy of control.
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For Gilman the desire for a physical makeover is thus an expression of a deeper fantasy of totality and closure, a yearning for the face that existed "before the world was made." This is also a desire for a world without difference, without the subjectivity of the self that emerges in response to the alterity of the other, and that has to learn how to live with this alterity.
This recognition of, and response to, the alterity of the other is precisely what the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas described as ethics. No matter how many fantasies of my own supremacy, moral superiority or political power I harbor, for Levinas I always find myself standing before the face of the Other, which is both my accusation and a source of my ethical responsibility. An ethical demand is made on me precisely through the face of the other. It is both mine and the Other's mortality, our being in the world as "being-towards-death," that inscribes our lives in an ethical horizon; and it is the Other's death in particular that challenges me and calls for my justification.
Levinas writes:
[I]n its mortality, the face before me summons me, calls for me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must be faced by the Other, pure otherness, separated, in some way, from any whole, were my business. It is as if that 
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The face Levinas talks about goes against our everyday understanding of this word, as it exceeds the collection of bodily features: "The face is a living presence", "more direct than visible manifestation," "it is expression…. The manifestation of the face is already discourse." 28 The face refuses to be contained, comprehended or encompassed, it cannot be seen, touched or possessed in any other way by me. 29 What
Levinas means by the face can perhaps thus be described as a face "before the world was made" -but we are talking here about my world: the face of the Other is always already there, waiting for me before I emerge as a subject. 30 Indeed, it is in relation to
difference, to what is not part of me, that my subjectivity will only be produced.
Naturally, there is no guarantee that I will respond ethically to this "visitation" from the Other' s face, and that I will not attempt to ignore or destroy it. But my murderous desire, my fantasy of control and mastery, does not change the fact that I am not the source of meaning in this world, that I am just thrown into it.
The desire to possess the face from the time "before the world was made," which Gilman talks about in relation to cosmetic surgery, can be translated into a desire for a world without alterity, for the annihilation of difference and return to a fantasy moment when the self was a master of time, space and language. Even though this fantasy can be said to arise out of a fear of difference and be driven by racism, sexism or homophobia, I want to suggest that we can also interpret it as an attempt to escape from the biopolitical regime that marks some bodies as different -racially, erotically, or in terms of their ability to perform well in the labor market. In other words, we can see it as a psychological defense mechanism that actually incorporates the splinters of the biopolitical thinking it wants to escape from, in the form of racism, sexism or body-and beauty-fascism. Of course, this is not to say that all those who opt for cosmetic surgery are racist or fascist, or to decide in advance that having a nose job or liposuction is politically and ethically "wrong." On both an emotional and political level, I can understand why people may want to have hair transplants or teeth veneers done, why they want rid of their "ugly" nose, 31 or why Michael Jackson wants to be white -even if each one of these transformations calls for a singular ethical response, which is likely to be different when surgery involves tooth correction and when it involves "race correction." I also need to stress that by no means do I want to dismiss cosmetic surgery clients as mere victims of the biopolitical regime, a pitiful object of analysis for a cultural critic who is somehow "above" them. 32 Neither do I want to valorize different cosmetic procedures in advance as "politically or ethically acceptable" (or not). Recognizing that there is no "pure" position when it comes to bodily transformation, and that we are all, in one way or another, participating in the culture of body makeover, I am only interested in denaturalizing this desire, as well as raising some questions for the media institutions (e.g. The Swan's producers) that strengthen it. At the same time, drawing on Levinas's ethics of alterity, I want to develop a counter-narrative to this story of biopolitical hegemony.
The area in which I locate this counter-narrative is bioethics. Bioethics is not for me yet another disciplinary practice telling us in advance how our bodies should and It is the interrogation of the last opposition, and of the principles of its constitution, that is the most urgent not only for Agamben but also for Jacques Derrida in the thinking of a new politics and a new ethics today. 34 Within this zone of indistinction or indetermination the human functions as "the place of a ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae and their rearticulation are always dislocated and displaced anew." 35 This obligation to make a decision, always anew, without merely resorting to fixed genealogical categories, is the source and task of this new bioethics.
Within this new ethical framework, the question of the human is inextricably linked with the question of the animal, since it is against the latter that the human is defined as the subject of morality and the agent of politics. Agamben points to the emergence of man "as man" through self-knowledge, a reflexive process which allows man to raise himself above himself and thus become different from himself. The process of differentiation at work in the constitution of the humanist definition of man seems double-edged, as man needs to become different from both the nature and the technology that frame him. Homo sapiens thus emerges as "a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human." In this process the nonhuman, the bestial, the technological and the machinic function as man's conditions of possibility above which he needs to elevate himself.
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And yet it could perhaps be argued that Agamben does not give due recognition to the technological element in the emergence of the human: technology still seems rather instrumental in Agamben's own argument (even if it is foundational to this definition of homo sapiens). We therefore need to turn to some other thinkers in order to explore the role of non-humans as both constitutive of humanity and a source of active "world making" in their own right. Donna Haraway and Jacques Derrida have, in different ways, taught us to understand the active being of non-humans as well as the "originary technicity" of humanity. 37 Indeed, for Derrida the demand that the radical alterity of technicity poses to the human is rerouted precisely through the animal. In a similar vein, Haraway's concept of the cyborg as our technological "other," outlined in her "Cyborg Manifesto," can be read as a productive zone of indistinction between ontological categories, as "[t]he cyborg appears precisely where the boundary between human and animal is transgressed." 38 The concept of the cyborg -a cybernetic organism which hybridizes machine and living organism, "a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" established not between normal and abnormal bodies (as it is in traditional bioethics), but rather between pre-and post-op ones. Indeed, in the Swan universe, it is the transformed bodies that are situated on the side of normality, and it is the most transformed participant that wins the coveted title of the swan (even if, as I argued earlier, the show's success depends on the disidentification between "real" and "transformed" bodies, and on the resulting moral elevation of the former over the latter).
The new bioethics of human-animal-machine kinship that I propose here attempts to undo the dominant media practices of biopolitical control The Swan explicitly draws on, which are directed at the erasure of alterity. In particular, this bioethics challenges the perception of the animal as a caesura of human-nonhuman separation and reveals the human as always already existing in a prosthetic relationship to its technologies.
If, according to Stanely Cavell, how we respond to animals, how we see ourselves standing in relation to them, is a test of how we respond to difference generally, how ready we are to be vulnerable to other embodiments in our knowledge of our own, 40 the use of "the swan" as a framing device for the show requires further analysis. It might be rather tempting to dismiss the use of the swan as just a conceptual gimmick, a playful reference to a children's tale in which animals serve only as metaphors for human behavior. And yet it is precisely this instrumentality in the use of the swan as a cultural concept representing radical visual transformation that deserves our attention.
It is also the proximity between the animality of the swan and the imperfect humanity should understand by now that we are not talking about a straightforward sacrifice but rather a disavowed one, in which both the act and the sacrificed object are reduced in significance. The ultimate disavowal seems to belong to the animal (of the bird variety).
The Swan can thus be said to be enacting the sacrificial economy of our culture, which structures the humanist idea of the human. The logic of this economy is precisely one of disavowed sacrifice: it is not based on a simple substitution through which animals would be killed instead of humans. Wolfe observes that, as "we do indeed kill humans all the time … it is in order to mark such killings as either 'criminal' or 'noncriminal' that the discourse of animality becomes so crucial." 42 zoology graduate who has done extensive research on primates. 45 As I explained earlier, animals were already of interest to her in her celebrated "Cyborg Manifesto" from two decades ago.
They become even more important in The Companion Species Manifesto, but this does not mean that there is no room for cyborgs in Haraway's later argument.
Cyborgs join there a bigger family of "companion species," a concept she finds more useful in guiding us "through the thickets of technobiopolitics in the Third
Millennium of the Current Era." In the age of soft technologies leading to the development of the patented, cancer-bearing OncoMouse™, or the first cloned animal, "Dolly the sheep," it is perhaps to be expected that Haraway's dogs are cyborgs of sorts, another example of "category deviants" inhabiting the complex networks of the technoscientific world, in which life is manufactured and nature is technological. 46 The singular, experiential materiality of dogs is of particular importance to Haraway, as dogs "are not here just to think with. They are here to live Relationality is crucial to this ethics of companion species, an ethics based on an ontology of co-evolution and co-emergence between humans and dogs, in which "none of the partners pre-exist the relating." 51 It is thus important to emphasize that it is not dogs that constitute a companion species for us, but rather "We are, constitutively, companion species. We make each other up, in the flesh." This is not to say that the (post-human) bioethics of companion species is impossible, or, more absurdly, that dogs should tell "us" what "they" want; only that a valuedriven theory of the good is not the most appropriate basis for this kind of ethics. 57 At best, Haraway sounds like a well-meaning Habermasian who believes companions species such as humans and dogs can work out together, in the process of joint "deliberation," a mutually satisfactory strategy for coexistence, at worst -e.g. when she calls for "agility" as a "good in itself" which allows both sides "to become more alert to the demands of significant otherness" 58 -as a good eugenicist. The narratives essence of the ethical relationship turns out to be not so incalculable after all," 66 in
Derrida this alterity is radicalized by inhering the prospect of an uncertain, perhaps monstrous arrival of the other for whom we do not yet have a name or concept, but also by considering that the radical, non-or in-human alterity of the other is perhaps a (disavowed) part of what we designate as "human," rather than being diametrically opposed to it. Derrida does not instruct us that animals, cyborgs or machines are like humans but rather that all these identitarian categories emerge only through fixing alterity as being always already "on the outside" of the one that is currently being defined. Through this process, the "animal" has become a "catch-all concept," naming "all the living things that man does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers." 67 It is "the word men have given themselves the right to give". In the context of the ethical issues concerning cosmetic surgery, body modification and women's beauty regimes explored in this article, I realize that there may be something rather frustrating about a bioethics that refuses to evaluate the morality of the actions in which the producers, participants and audiences of the radical makeover
show The Swan are engaged. And indeed, the kind of bioethics I have in mind here will not provide us with a definite set of values concerning cosmetic surgery; it will not teach us where to draw the line between necessary and cosmetic procedures.
Neither will it help us decide in advance whether people should or should not engage in beauty transformation, or whether the correction of a bumpy nose is more justifiable morally than a boob job or an ear one one's arm. 69 What it will do instead (perhaps adding to the frustration of those who already have clear expectations of the tasks bioethics should undertake and the questions it should answer), is shift the parameters of the ethical debate: from an individualistic problem-based moral paradigm in which rules can be rationally, strategically worked out on the basis of a previously agreed principle -e.g. that it is the sum total of happiness of all beings that counts, or that I should respect the (human or even non-human) other as much as I love myself -to a broader political context in which individual decisions are always involved in complex relations of power, economy and ideology. It is precisely out of this tension between the need to respond the alterity of the other always in a singular way, and the fact that there is more than one other in the world that is simultaneously making a demand on me, that a responsible nonfoundational bioethics can emerge.
